近二十年前，《京都議定書》以具有法律約束力的方式為發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家分配了減排目標(biāo)。盡管表面上看起來(lái)裝有“牙齒”，但京都模式脫離各國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)政治現(xiàn)實(shí)的弊端也逐漸顯現(xiàn)。尤其是，這一“自上而下”的氣候治理方式在主要排放國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)遭遇重重阻力：美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)從未核準(zhǔn)該議定書，加拿大也于2011年宣布退出。2009年哥本哈根氣候大會(huì)之后，國(guó)際氣候制度的構(gòu)建方式已經(jīng)呈現(xiàn)出明顯變化，逐漸演進(jìn)為以國(guó)家自主決定貢獻(xiàn)（INDC）為特征的“自下而上”模式。然而，這一新發(fā)展對(duì)于國(guó)際社會(huì)開展應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化合作、實(shí)現(xiàn)《公約》目標(biāo)又帶來(lái)了諸多新的挑戰(zhàn)。

從自上而下到自下而上

《公約》及其《議定書》所搭建起來(lái)的國(guó)際氣候制度框架，在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家與發(fā)展中國(guó)家之間豎了一道“防火墻”，兩者責(zé)任、義務(wù)與權(quán)利顯著不同。在實(shí)現(xiàn)《公約》目標(biāo)的前提下，并根據(jù)各國(guó)達(dá)成共識(shí)的原則和規(guī)則，發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家需要率先承擔(dān)量化減排的氣候承諾、并對(duì)發(fā)展中國(guó)家提供支持。而發(fā)展中國(guó)家則需要在得到發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家相關(guān)支持的情況下、根據(jù)國(guó)家自身國(guó)情采取積極行動(dòng)?！毒┒甲h定書》是自上而下模式推進(jìn)國(guó)際氣候制度構(gòu)建的典型代表，這一模式一直延續(xù)到巴厘路線圖所確立的“雙軌談判”時(shí)期。

雙軌談判是指，一方面，簽署《京都議定書》的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家要在京都第二承諾的特設(shè)工作組中，談判形成2012年以后的大幅度量化減排指標(biāo)；另一方面，發(fā)展中國(guó)家和未簽署《京都議定書》的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家（主要是指美國(guó)）則要在《聯(lián)合國(guó)氣候變化框架公約》下，在促進(jìn)長(zhǎng)期合作行動(dòng)的特設(shè)工作組中談判討論進(jìn)一步應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化的措施。

自上而下模式往往法律約束力強(qiáng)，伴有較為嚴(yán)格的遵約機(jī)制，核算規(guī)則統(tǒng)一，且設(shè)有嚴(yán)格的測(cè)量、匯報(bào)、核證規(guī)則以確保透明度，但是各方達(dá)成行動(dòng)共識(shí)的難度大、進(jìn)度慢。受制于主要談判締約方（主要是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家）國(guó)內(nèi)政治的制約，尤其伴隨著全球政治經(jīng)濟(jì)與排放格局的發(fā)展，并且受到全球金融危機(jī)的影響，2009年的哥本哈根大會(huì)并未達(dá)成既定成果，自上而下模式的發(fā)展遭遇重大挫折。

在上述國(guó)際背景之下，國(guó)際氣候合作呈現(xiàn)從“南北矛盾”向“大國(guó)博弈”和“大小之爭(zhēng)”過(guò)渡的趨勢(shì)。傘形國(guó)家集團(tuán)所提出的“國(guó)家行動(dòng)計(jì)劃表”、“允諾加審評(píng)”的模式更好地契合了關(guān)鍵締約方的國(guó)內(nèi)政治，也更好地匹配了全球氣候博弈的國(guó)際政治，逐漸獲得了越來(lái)越多締約方的認(rèn)可。以此為基礎(chǔ)，哥本哈根和坎昆兩次會(huì)議醞釀和開啟了公約締約方共同做出減排允諾的新規(guī)則。2013年，華沙大會(huì)啟動(dòng)各國(guó)2020年后行動(dòng)的INDC進(jìn)程（即由各國(guó)自行提交的“自主貢獻(xiàn)預(yù)案”），表明了以自下而上模式推進(jìn)國(guó)際氣候治理取得共識(shí)，也為2015年達(dá)成巴黎協(xié)議傳遞了重要的積極信號(hào)。新模式下，主要依靠各國(guó)自行提出各自的氣候行動(dòng)或目標(biāo)，而不再通過(guò)艱苦談判強(qiáng)制分配。匯總后的目標(biāo)相應(yīng)形成全球目標(biāo)和共同行動(dòng)。

相對(duì)于《公約》確立的原則與規(guī)則，以INDC進(jìn)程為基礎(chǔ)的“自下而上”模式更多考慮到各國(guó)的自身國(guó)情，是一種在各國(guó)國(guó)家利益的最大公約數(shù)基礎(chǔ)上推進(jìn)國(guó)際氣候合作、尋求實(shí)現(xiàn)公約目標(biāo)的機(jī)制。該模式往往具有“非強(qiáng)迫”和“非侵入”的特征，各國(guó)行動(dòng)與目標(biāo)也通常是多元化和多樣性的，更有可能伴隨合作性和促成性機(jī)制的構(gòu)建，更易于吸引各方積極參與；但由于可能缺乏統(tǒng)一核算規(guī)則，缺乏對(duì)目標(biāo)力度的指導(dǎo)和強(qiáng)制性要求，因此難以保證行動(dòng)的整體力度，各國(guó)間的政治互信與積極互動(dòng)也有待進(jìn)一步增強(qiáng)。

被打破的“防火墻”

INDC進(jìn)程是國(guó)際氣候制度發(fā)展之路的重大轉(zhuǎn)折，對(duì)全球氣候治理會(huì)產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)影響。綜觀各國(guó)提交的INDC文件，這些“自主貢獻(xiàn)”五花八門、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不一，且主要根據(jù)各國(guó)自身對(duì)其責(zé)任與能力的理解而自主提出，實(shí)際上已經(jīng)打破了發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家和發(fā)展中國(guó)家在公約及其議定書框架下關(guān)于各國(guó)責(zé)任、與責(zé)任相對(duì)應(yīng)的承諾和行動(dòng)的“防火墻”。INDC進(jìn)程實(shí)質(zhì)上是對(duì)共同但有區(qū)別的責(zé)任原則、各自能力原則、各自國(guó)情及其對(duì)應(yīng)的“不對(duì)稱承諾”在公約框架之下的新的再平衡。

這一“自下而上”的進(jìn)程引發(fā)了國(guó)家承諾與行動(dòng)的本質(zhì)變化。共同但有區(qū)別的責(zé)任原則和公平原則是國(guó)際氣候治理制度的核心基石。該原則將發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家歷史上的排放責(zé)任與應(yīng)盡義務(wù)，與發(fā)展中國(guó)家未來(lái)的發(fā)展訴求與排放空間需要協(xié)調(diào)起來(lái)，將發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的技術(shù)、資金優(yōu)勢(shì)，與發(fā)展中國(guó)家亟待提高的能力以及全球應(yīng)對(duì)氣候變化的整體需要聯(lián)系起來(lái)，最終以“二分法”和附件區(qū)分的形式，實(shí)現(xiàn)各國(guó)共同但有區(qū)別地承擔(dān)“不對(duì)稱承諾”。

然而在當(dāng)前的INDC進(jìn)程中，不管是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家還是發(fā)展中國(guó)家都共同地、自主地、不分先后地、甚至是在不論是否得到理應(yīng)獲得支持的情況下，在同一個(gè)談判軌道中提出各自的目標(biāo)與行動(dòng)，且這樣的承諾還有可能逐步面臨統(tǒng)一的法律約束力與透明度要求。這一發(fā)展趨勢(shì)，對(duì)于發(fā)展中國(guó)家公約義務(wù)的未來(lái)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生新的、額外的壓力。在“防火墻”岌岌可危的情況下，如何處理好氣候責(zé)任的平衡，避免氣候責(zé)任的大國(guó)逃避責(zé)任與公約義務(wù)，是國(guó)際氣候制度未來(lái)所面臨的重大挑戰(zhàn)。

另一方面，根據(jù)締約方提交的INDC文件，各國(guó)的責(zé)任、承諾與行動(dòng)均以各國(guó)“差異自表”的方式來(lái)體現(xiàn)。由此，各國(guó)開展氣候行動(dòng)的法律基礎(chǔ)，從對(duì)于氣候責(zé)任的擔(dān)當(dāng)，轉(zhuǎn)向了更多取決于國(guó)家自身能力和行動(dòng)意愿。這一發(fā)展趨勢(shì)，是以實(shí)力為基礎(chǔ)的大國(guó)政治博弈和關(guān)鍵國(guó)家國(guó)內(nèi)政治的產(chǎn)物。它繞開了以升溫目標(biāo)和排放空間為基礎(chǔ)的多邊氣候規(guī)則的科學(xué)性、公平性和有效性，使氣候責(zé)任的大國(guó)得以擺脫自上而下的碳排放預(yù)算束縛。事實(shí)上，這種發(fā)展容易成為眾多締約方、尤其是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家逃避自身責(zé)任與義務(wù)的跳船平臺(tái)，也難以有力、有效、公平地控制住全球排放的趨勢(shì)。

不僅如此，目前發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的INDC文件以減緩為基本內(nèi)容，不包括適應(yīng)、資金、技術(shù)、能力建設(shè)以及行動(dòng)與支持的透明度等要素，本質(zhì)是對(duì)其公約下所需承擔(dān)義務(wù)的規(guī)避，實(shí)質(zhì)上使得INDC進(jìn)程無(wú)法反映國(guó)際氣候制度的所有核心要素，不利于達(dá)成全面、平衡、可持續(xù)實(shí)施的新協(xié)議。《公約》對(duì)于減緩與適應(yīng)的共同關(guān)注，以及對(duì)于氣候行動(dòng)的力度、潛力、甚至是為發(fā)展中國(guó)家行動(dòng)提供支持的安排，不僅是對(duì)于長(zhǎng)期轉(zhuǎn)型與當(dāng)下應(yīng)對(duì)的權(quán)衡，也是對(duì)發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家與發(fā)展中國(guó)家在責(zé)任、權(quán)利、能力與發(fā)展階段之間的權(quán)衡。當(dāng)前“自下而上”的氣候治理進(jìn)程所體現(xiàn)出的有所偏頗的議題推進(jìn)，未必有利于構(gòu)建公平正義的國(guó)際氣候制度，也難以真正提升全球行動(dòng)力度，而全球行動(dòng)力度則是實(shí)現(xiàn)《公約》目標(biāo)的關(guān)鍵。

本文得到WWF中國(guó)氣候與能源項(xiàng)目的支持，文中觀點(diǎn)紕漏由作者自行承擔(dān)，對(duì)此作者深表感謝。

鄧梁春，世界自然基金會(huì)（WWF）項(xiàng)目顧問(wèn)，主要研究方向?yàn)槟茉础h(huán)境與氣候變化政策，國(guó)際氣候治理制度。

The Paris climate change talks have just kicked-off, and there is general agreement amongst international society and the participants: a new global climate deal will be struck. That deal will be based on the UNFCCC, but different from the Kyoto Protocol in terms of degree of participation, strength of action taken, transparency and legal force.

Almost twenty years ago the Kyoto Protocol set legally binding emissions reduction targets for the developed nations. Despite appearing to have real force, it became increasingly apparent that Kyoto failed to take into account domestic political realities. As a result this “top-down” method of climate governance faced obstacle after obstacle in major carbon emitting nations: The US never ratified it; in 2011 Canada pulled out. After the Copenhagen talks in 2009 changes started to be seen in how international climate mechanisms were being put together, and the “bottom-up” INDC system took shape. But this development brings its own challenges for the world’s efforts to respond to climate change and implement the aims of the UNFCCC.

From top-down to bottom-up

The climate system put in place by the UNFCC and the Kyoto Protocol put a “firewall” in place between developed and developing nations: the two groups had different responsibilities, duties, and rights. The developed nations were to make earlier commitments to reduce emissions than developing nations, and to provide them with support. Meanwhile, on receiving that support the developing nations were to act on climate change in accordance with their national circumstances. The Kyoto Protocol was an example of a “top-down” approach to building a system of climate governance, an approach which continued until the “two-track negotiations” of the Bali Roadmap.

Those two-track negotiations meant the developed nation signatories to the Kyoto Protocol would set up special working groups during the second commitment period to set quantified targets for major emissions cuts post-2012; while developing nations and those developed nations not signed up to Kyoto (primarily the US) would discuss further climate change response measures in special working groups designed to foster long-term cooperation.

The top-down approach was legally binding and had strong enforcement mechanisms and a powerful measurement, reporting and verification system to ensure transparency. But reaching consensus was difficult and progress was slow. The domestic politics of key signatories (primarily the developed nations), particularly due to changes in the global political economy and the make-up of global emissions, and the impact of the financial crisis, meant no deal was reached in Copenhagen – a huge setback for the top-down approach.

Against this background we saw international climate interaction shift from north and south being in opposition, to a battle between the major powers, and between the large and small nations. The National Action Plans suggested by the Umbrella Group and the Commitment and Review approaches were found to better suit the needs of both international climate diplomacy and domestic politics. As such, these ideas became increasingly accepted and the Copenhagen and Cancun talks saw new rules for managing emissions commitments take shape.

In Warsaw in 2013 the INDC process was started – by 2020 each country would submit its own independently determined plans for emission cuts. There was now agreement on a new bottom-up approach, and the outlook for Paris was looking up. The new approach meant countries would put forward their own climate action plans and targets, rather than having this set through tortuous negotiations processes, and those plans and targets would, in the aggregate, represent joint action plans and global targets.

The INDC approach takes more account of national circumstances than the principles and rules embodied in the UNFCCC, representing an attempt to achieve the UNFCCC’s goals by relying on the individual national interest. It is voluntary and non-intrusive, and the action plans and targets it produces are diverse and varied, and may by accompanied with cooperative and facilitative mechanisms encouraging further participation. But a lack of a single verification method or a mechanism to encourage or require tougher targets mean it cannot ensure overall action with be powerful enough, and political trust and positive interactions still need to be strengthened.

Knocking down the firewall

The INDCs are a major change and will have a significant impact on global climate governance. The INDCs submitted are very varied and of different standards, and based on each country’s understanding of its own responsibilities and capabilities. In effect the UNFCCC’s distinction between the responsibilities of developed and developed nations, and the associated actions to be taken, has been broken down. The INDC process is in effect a rebalancing of the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities, respective capabilities, national circumstances and the corresponding “unequal commitments” of the UNFCC.

The new system changes the nature of national commitments and action. The principles of common but differentiated responsibility and fairness are the foundation of international climate governance, both coordinating the responsibility of the developed nations for their historical emissions with the need for future development and emissions of the developing world; and linking the technological and financial strengths of the developing nations with the urgent need for capacity building in developing nations and the overall global need to respond to climate change. This ultimately led to the “unequal commitments”, via the “dichotomy” and the annexes.

But in the current INDC process, both developed and developing nations are setting their own targets and action plans on one negotiating track: together, of their own accord, at the same time, and even without reference to whether or not support has been received. However, over time there will be calls for these targets to become legally binding and more transparent. That means new and unexpected pressure for developing nations. With the “firewall” at risk of collapse, there is a major new challenge for the global climate system: how to balance climate responsibilities and avoid major powers shirking their responsibilities under the UNFCCC.

Also, the INDCs allow each country to decide upon its own responsibilities, commitments and actions. This means the legal basis for national action is shifting from climate responsibility to respective capability and intent. That trend is the outcome of the realpolitik of major power diplomacy and the domestic politics of key countries. It bypasses the more scientific, fair and effective approach of a multilateral system based on limiting temperature rises, and allows major powers with climate responsibilities to avoid the limiting emission quotas of a top-down system. The change will make it easier for signatories, particularly the developed nations, to avoid their responsibilities and duties; and will make it more difficult to put in place strong, effective and fair controls on global emissions.

Moreover, the INDCs of developed nations are currently primarily about mitigation – adaptation, funding, technology and capacity building are missing, as are measures for transparency of actions taken and support given. This is in effect the avoidance of duties accepted under the UNFCCC, and means basic parts of the international climate system are missing from the INDC process. This will not help us reach a new powerful, balanced and sustainable agreement.

The UNFCCC’s coverage of both mitigation and adaptation, as well as the strength and potential for action of individual nations, and even the arrangements for support for action in developing countries, represented both a balancing of the need for long-term transitions and immediate response, and a consideration of the different responsibilities, duties, capabilities and stages of development of the developed and developing nations. The new bottom-up process has not advanced that agenda equally, which will not help build a fair and just system, or increase global efforts overall. And it is the strength of global efforts that will determine whether or not the aims of the UNFCC are achieved.

The author is grateful for support from WWF China’s Climate and Energy Programme for this article. The author is responsible for the views expressed in the article.